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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and

Respondent~

Case

-VS.,..,

Noo 14962

PAUL BUDDY ST o CLAIR,

Defendant and Appellanto

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
An information charging Paul Buddy St(t Clair with

the crime of murder in the first degree was filed on
September 14, l953c

A motion for a change of venue was

filed with the court on September 14, 1953, on the grounds

that a fair and impartial trial could not be had in Tooele
County o

This motion was denied by the court anq a plea of

not-guilty was entered by the defendant, and the case
came on for trial on January 12, 1954o
the defendant

guil~

The jurors found

of murder in the first degree and

an appeal was taken to this court o·

This court ordered
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Salt Lake City, County of

Sa~t

Lake, Utah, with the

Honorable A. Ho Ellett presiding()

The case came on

for trial on November 15th, 19550
The jury was duly impanelled and sworn in and the

State proceeded to offer testimony in support of the
charges of first degree murder as alleged in the informationo

The testimony disclosed that Paul St«> Clair

went to the home of the deceased, Vesta Wittke, at
about

1~15

A0M0 on the morning of Ju~ 6th, 1953~

There is a great deal of conflicting testimony as to

what occurred there, but it is certain that Mrs«> Wittke
was shot three times and died from these wounds at about

11:05 P.Mo that same day.

(R@ 97)

Dro Wallace Johnson testified on behalf of the State
that he examined Mrse Wittke early on the morning of
July

6th, 1953; that he found two wounds having the

appearance of bullet holes, and that she was then in
critical conditione

(RG> 96)

He stated in his opinion

that death resulted from gunshot wounds$

(R. 100)

He

later removed the two bullets from the body and turned

them over to the Tooele County Sheriff0

(R~ 98)

Patricia Wittke testified that she had known the

defendant about one year, that he had boarded with the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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C~on,

Wittke familY in Grantsville and also in Pine

the last time being about Thanksgiving of the previous

rear. She further testified that on the night of

5th, 1953, she had left the home about
on a dateo

She returned about

4~30 P~MG

11~30 PoM~,

Julf

to go

talked with

her mother for awhile (Ro 114) and she and her mother
{deceased) went to bedo

Patricia and her mother slept

She was later awakened and looking up

in the same bed"

she saw defendant at the foot of the bed with a gun in

his hando

(Ro 115)

She heard her mother say,

~

God,

Paul don't~" She onlY heard one shot fired, (Ro 116)
crawled over the foot of the bed and grabbed Paul's haire
She and her mother, the deceasedj struggled with Paul.
PatrieiaWs older brother, Daytonj was called and he came

into the bedroom and took the gun
ing it on himo

a~

from Paul, hold-

Dayton told Patricia to get his e22e

This she did, loaded it and brought it back to Daytone
The deceased asked Patricia to go call

Fay Gillette the

Sheriff~

Fay, meaning

Patricia then told the next

door neighbor Bruce Sagers to call Fay as she did not
know the numbero
phone0

The Wittke home did not have a tele-

Patricia upon returning home found Dayton and

Jack (a younger brother)on the front porche
defendant was gone o

The

She went in to her mother, now

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on the bed, who asked her if she had called the ambulance or doQtoro

her to call. one$

Upon being told nog the deceased told
(Ro 123)

She again ran to Sagers and

Mr. Sagers informed her that the Sheriff had taken care

of that"
Dayton Wittke testified that about two

d~s

before

the shooting his mother came in and got him out of bed
during the night and told him to go call the Sheriff
in order to get St «> Clair out of the house$

He went

into the kitchen where his mother and Paul were.

Paul

kept asking for the keys to his car, which Vesta had
taken, and Vesta said she would not give them to him
until the Sheriff got thereo

A scuffle ensued, during

which time Mrso Wittke hit Sto Clair two
~

the head with

~

three times

stove poker while Dayton held Paul's

arms behind his backa

(R$ 151)

On the night of July

about 11:00 PeMo

}2.!:

5th~

1953, Dayton retired

He was awakened about

the 6th by Patricia!s screamingo

1~30

A.M. of

Upon entering his

mother's bedroom he saw his mother and Patricia

grappling with Paul, who finally sat down in a rocking

chair~;>

Dayton took the gun from defendant, who

then said, "Go ahead and shoot meo'!

Dayton pointed

the gun at him, pulled the trigger, but the gun misfirec
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---~:-;;- ,-~~::~~~-;;;..;,;W;:-\<0;:;.;;-:-:;~~--~ '~he

o22, which she did'

and he held this on the

defendant~

During

thi~ _ time

''Go

ahead -and

the defendant repeatedly kept saying~

shoot me."

(Ro 155-6)

Defendant subsequently walked

out through the kitchen and the front dooro

Dayton's

brother Jack came in and Dayton told him to get the
shotgun, he then followed Paul with both guns and took -! shot at Paul's

~

with the

o

22

~

he drove away

C)

(R. 156)
At this time Patricia returned from the Sagers
and informed Dayton that his mother had been

shot~

Dayton had not known about the shooting until this
time~

He then went into the house and stayed with his

mother until she was taken to the hospit&lo

The testimony of Mr4) Sam J

0

(Ro

156)

Walters, now dec-

eased, was read into the record on the basis of his
prior testimony in the first trial of this ca.seo

He

testified that the defendant came to his home the

night before the shooting and borrowed a gun and shells
from him0

Ste Clair told him he was going to go target

shooting with a friendo

(Ro 194)

Mro Bruce Sagers, a next door neighbor of the

Wittkes!, testified that he heard what he thought were
firecrackers earlY the morning of July 6, 1953o

-5-
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(Re 187)

He then heard screaming and opened the door and met

Patricia thereo
mother~"

"She said that Paul had shot her

(Ro 187)

He then called Sheriff Fay

Gillette and went to the Wittke home with Patricia$
Vesta~s bedroom~

When he came into
before I pa.ss

out~

she said,

'~ruce,

I would like you to know what

happened(iln She said-9 t!Paul carne in and turned on the

light and began shootingo

He said, 'This is pay day,

Vesta.' and began shootingottl

told by

~~So

childreno

(Ro 189)

Mro Sagers was

Wittke to see if he could quiet the

Mro Sagers further testified that he had

seen Paul in and around the house shortly after they
moved to Pine Canyono
Mro Fay Gillette, the Sheriff of Tooele County,

testified as to two separate incidentso

First he

testified that he picked up the defendant shortly after

he had been beaten over the head by the deceased with
a poker, and that in his opinion he was drunk at the

timeG

(Ro 199)

While he was taking the defendant to

Tooele to have his head stitched and bandaged the
defendant said he would get even with that little son
of a b.....=>-- 9 Dayton, and that there would be a pay day

for Vestae

-6--
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He also testified that he had seen Vesta on July 5,

195.3, in .his home and that her physical appearance was
good but that she appeared worriedo

(Ro 201)

Upon his arriving at the Wittke home on the night
of the shooting, he found Vesta in bed with two bullet
holes in her bodyo

He also found a bullet hole in the

headboard of the bed apd in the east wall of the bedroom~

He found a gun on top of the dresser with five

shells in it, three of which had been fired; and the
one under the firing pin having been hit by the firing
pin, but had not fired and one that was intact.

(R. 211)

He further testified that the defendant was picked
up by him about

4~30 PoM~

of July 6, 1953, and taken

into custody*

Mr. Joseph Ao

Shields~

called by the defense,

testified that Ste Clair approached him on the night
of July

3, 1953, and said that he

going to take

St~

-vas

hurt ct

He was

Clair to the doctor when Sheriff

Gillette arrivede
Dre Phillip J o Antrim's prior testimony was read

into the record upon stipulation of counsele

Dr.

Antrim testified that he sewed up the wounds of the

defendant on the night of the beating; there were
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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two wounds; one was

th~ee

was one inch longo

He further testified that he

inches long and the other

observed no indication of intoxication on the part of
the defendant.

Mr. Rex Mueller testified that he had seen the
defendant on July 4th and that the ·defendant t s head
was bandaged.

He also testified that he had seen the

defendant with Vesta Wittke numerous times.

Also, he

and St. Clair had gone target shooting together on
several occasions.

(R~

252)

Dr. Jack Tedrow, called by the defense, testified

that he examined the defendant on October 14, 1953,
and that he found a large lump over the vertex of the

skull. When asked what the effect of such a blow might
be on or about July 6th or three days after the beating
he replied,

'~h

a person in that condition would be

what we would term hyperirritability"'

That is, he

would respond more to certain action than he would
ordinarily.

He would be in less control of his temper.

He would probably be bothered more by loud noises;

more easily irritated, you would say, and certainly
not able to reason in his normal capacity9"

(R. 273)

The defendant took the stand in his own behalf

and testified as to the incidents that lead up to his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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being hit with the poker and things incident thereto.
He testified as to the shooting itself0

He stated

that he went home in response to an earlier phone call
by Vesta telling him she wanted to see him0

Upon

arriving at the Wittke home he entered by way of the
unlocked screen door, he didn!t find Mrs$ Wittke on

the love seat or dufold so he went into her bedroom.
{R. 286)
'~ou

He turned on the light, and Mrs. Wittke said,

finally got hereQ"

(R0 287)

He asked her what

she wanted and she informed him she regretted the

beating and that she wanted things as they were before.
(R. 287)

Defendant said that he wouldn't do this and

that he wasn't going to continue their relationship.
He didn't want anything to do with her.

He informed her

that she could add the hospital bill she caused by the

beating to what she already owed

him~

To this she said,

"if this is - - - I don't owe you anything,

said,

'~ou

have been well paid0

Remember?"

Paul~"

She

(R. 288)

Defendant then testified that from this conversation

until he found himself sitting on the edge of the chair,
with Dayton standing over to the right of him and the
gun lying on the bed 1 he remembers nothing.

(R. 288)

He stated that he did not remember anything said to him;
during the time of the shooting, Dayton's picking up
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the gun, pointing it at him and pulling the trigger, nor

Patricia and Vesta's hitting him and pulling his hair.
(R. 289)

He left in his car and drove in the vicinity

of Wendover and Magna, Utah, and was apprehended late
in the afternoon of July 6, 1953, near Tooele, Utah,
by Sheriff Gilletteo

STATEMENT OF ERRORS

Io
The court erred in giving instruction number 15
/

because it failed to clearly and properly distinguish
between first and second degree murder.

II.
The court erred in admitting certain physical
evidence which ·was prejudicial to·the defendant.

IIIe

The court erred in not permitting Sheriff Gillette
to testify as to the meaning of

stated

br the

murder.

threat~ing

wrds.

defendant three nays before the alleged

This was error because the meaning of the

words were not submitted to the jury in their proper

context.

The evidence is legally insufficient to support

the verdict of first degree murder0

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT

lo
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NUMBER 15
BECAUSE IT FAILED TO CLEARLY AND PROPERLY DISTINGUISH
BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE MURDERo

This court has repeatedly stated that 'Where
possible the use of technical legal terms and cumbersome definitions thereof should be avoided so that the

laymen

on the jury can understand themo

State v.

Thompson, __u., __ , 170 Po 2d 153, 162, and citations
therein.

The instructions, as given in this ca$e,

defining the elements of first degree murder and
second degree murder for the jur,y do not follow this
eourtts previous admonitiono

Second degree murder is

defined in such similar terminology that it is

ex~

tremely difficult for anyone to see any difference.
Instruction number 14 defines
murder and we do not question its

firs~

degree

accuracy~

However,

instruction 15 fails to properly define second degree
'

murder so as to distinguish it from first degree murder.
Instruction number fifteen was given as follows:
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" You are further instructed * * * First, that on
or about the 6th day of July, 1953, at Tooele County,
State of Utah~ the defendant killed Vesta Wittke.
Second, that the killing was with malice aforethought. Third~ that the defendant intended !t_2
.kill V·esta Wittke but that he did not deliberate _
_2!:. premeditate uponkilling:-ort'hat the·
defendant did not intend to kill Vesta Wittke but
that he did intend to do great bodily harm to
Vesta Wittkeo Fourth~ that the said killing was
unlawfulo Fifth~ that the killing was felonious.
Sixth, that the said Vesta Wittke died within a
year and a day after the cause of death was administeredo" (emphasis added)
'
In distinguishing
between first and second degree

murder it is essential that the necessar,y elements for

each be set forth and clearly defined so the jurors will
be able to intelligently reach a just verdict.

It is clear that if appellant is to be found
guilty of first degree murder he must fall within
category one as defined in State

145 Po2d
n

1003~

Vo

Russell,

106 U. 116,

1QQ8g

Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in
wait £!:..any other kind 2f 'Willful~ .deliberate,
malicious §fid premeditated killing ~ murder
in the· first degree.n
(emphasis added)
(76-3~3 UoCoAo 1953)
The elements of first degree murder within

categor,y one are:
lo

Unlawful killing_ of a human being,

2o

With malice aforethought~

3o

With premeditation5J and deliberation,
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4o With specific intent to kill the person killedo

The aerinition of the aforesaid elements is
absolutely necessary in order to avoid confusing the
jurors with second degree murder; for second degree
murder does not require

premeditation~

deliberation,

or the specific intent to kill the person killed, while
first degree murder under category one doese
To be guilty of second degree murder, all the jury
need find is that the defendant intended to do great
bodily harm or to do an act lmowing the reasonable and
natural consequences thereof would be likely to cause
death or great bodily injury o

It is important to note

that s_pecific intent to kill the person killed is nat
necessaryo

Also in second degree

murder~

malice afore-

thought refers to a design thought out beforehand to
do great bodily harm or to do an act knowing great
bodily injury or death might naturally followo
State Vo Trujillo~ ~Uo

~ 214 Po2d

626o

First degree murder goes much farther, for it
requires that not only must malice aforethought be
present, but also

~he

defendant must cociDy_ and calmly

conceive a plan to kill the particular person (under
category one which is the division under which the
defendant was tried) o
Applying this distinction to the facts of this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
errors.
-~
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case · ·

"'

,_

,_ :::::,

and fully

appr~sea 't nat,

u·

,tjUCid.y

St e Clair went to the home of

VestaWittke to do great bodily harm or commit an act

which might naturally tend to do great bodily injury
or to kill

her~

they must find the defendant not guilty

of first degree murder but guilty of second degree

murdero

If.s>

however~

the jury finds that the defendant

went to the home of Vesta Wittke with a :specific intent

to kill Vesta Wittke and did plan to kill and did in
fact ld.ll her :1 they may find the def enda.nt guilty of
murder_ in the first degree under category one o

Not only did the court not clearly distinguish
between the specific intent to kill the person killed
and the intent merely to do great bodily harm or to do
an act tending to naturally kill or do great bodily
harm but also inserts the elements of premeditation

and deliberation into the second degree definitiono

It is true that instruction number 15 says that second
degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought but
and premeditation; however the fact

witho~t

deliberation

that the terms

"deliberate" and 8Bpremedit ate us are included in a

negative fashion would naturally cause the jury to

attempt to make distinctions that courts themselves
cannot satisfactorily makeo

D-eliberation-and
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premea1tat1on to be clearly presented to the jur.y should

be limited to the affirmative definition of first degree
murder and not the negative definition of second degree
murder.

To include the terms in both definitions is to

cause confusiono
This is true because of the great difficulty in
adequate~

and concisely distinguishing between malice

aforethought 9 premeditation and deliberationo

These

terms are used so interchangeably that for the court to
say you must find malice aforethought but not

deliber~

ation or premeditation is to cause the jurors to ask

themselves what the difference

is~

for they all refer

to degrees of planning and weighing a proposed activity.

Justice Wade 9 s opinion in State

Vo

Russell, supra, at

page 1009 makes it clear that it is almost impossible
to distinguish between malice aforethought 9 premeditation
or deliberationa
''How can an act be done with "Malice aforethought
but without deliberation and premeditation? All
three of these italicized terms are usual~ used
interchangeably and with the same meaningo The
ter.ms premeditation and aforethought both mean to
think out~ plan or design beforehando Some courts
make a slight distinction between those terms and
the term deliberation holding that it requires
more calmness of mind and coolness of blood for
deliberation than merely to premeditate and think
out beforehand~ but other courts refuse to make
such a distinction o There can be no distinction
in the length of time required to think out
agl5=
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premeditation and deliberation.
Such instruction was certainly confusingo" Cases
cited thereino
ueLorenana~ 1n

Therefore, because instruction number fifteen fails
to clearly distinguish second degree murder and first
degree murder under category one as to malice aforethought~ deliberation~

premeditation and specific in-

tent, the defendant was prejudiced and should be granted
a new trial in which the jury would not be confused by

an improper instruction as set forth aboveo
IIo

THE COURT ERRED IN

AD~UTTING

CERTAIN PHYSICAL

EVIDENCE WHICH WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT
The defendant us knife rnarkei as exhibit 12 was
admitted in as evidence by the court; yet the F oBoi.
report read as follows:
No foreign deposits of metal or paint were found
on the blades or in the blade recesses of the
pocket knife~ specimen Q=7~ which could be identified as having come from the section of the screen,
specimen K=2o None of the individual cut strands
of wire in the screen contain tool markings suitable for identification purposeso It was not
possible, therefore~ to associate by tool marking
comparisons the knife~ Q~7~ as the tool used to
cut the submitted screen~ K=2en (Ro 217)
n

From this report it is evident there was no relevancy or a proper nconnecting upn between the knife
found on the defendant and the screen door to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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c=1hc=

Wittke nome Which was ripped openo

Despite this expert

testimony the court interjected its conclusions between
the knife and the cut in the screen door. (R216)
"THE COURT:

Well, you would hardly expect the harder

blade of a knife to leave a part of its metal on soft
copper wireo I would think you would look for the
soft metal on the hard metalo 99
Clearly this was prejudicial ·to the defendant's rights

because the courtRs comments on the evidence

certain~

misled the juryo
The screen itself was improperly admitted on two
grounds:
First, there was no evidence or testimony that the
defendantns knife was used to cut the screen dooro
Second~

there was no testimony or evidence that would

establish that the screen door was cut from the outside
or that the defendant may have cut ito

In fact the

photograph of the screen (exhibit 7) and the screen
itself indicates there is a high probability that the
screen was cut from the insideo
There is no doubt that the screen door was introduced
to show the willful intention of the defendant to gain
entrance to the Wittke home and thereby place him in a
position where he could commit the alleged murdero
F·or the court to admit the knife and screen was to
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impress

'tine JUry Wl.th the

car, took out his pocket_

idea that the defendant left his
knife~

cut the screen door from thE

out. side~ unlatched the screen door and then entered the
home and shot and killed Vesta. Wittkeo

prejudiciale

It is granted that the

This was extremely

defen~ant's

posses-

sion of the knife coupled with the fact that the screen was
cut raises some possibility that the defendant used his
knife to cut the

screen~

but there was no evidence or

testimony introduced which connects the knife to the cut

in the screen door or that the defendant did cut the
screeno

It is supposition unsupported by the evidenceo

Evidence which has no tendency to establish the guilt
or innocence of accused.? and

which~

.if effective at all,

could only serve only to prejudice or

mislead~

or excite

the minds and inflame the passion of the jury should

not be admittedo

22

CoJoS

922

The improper admission with its necessary inferences
established for the jury that the defendant acted
fully~

will~

with deliberation premeditation, and malice

aforethought

o

Not only did the court improperly admit the physical
evidence but it committed greater error by commenting on
the evidence it self o There can be no doubt that a juror

would give considerable weight to comments made from the
bene-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ln V1ew or the aforesaid statements it seems clear
that it was error for the court to admit and comment on
the physical evidence improperly admittede

IIIo
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT PERMITTING SHERIFF GILLETTE
TO TESTIFY AS TO THE MEANING OF THREATENING WORDS STATED
BY THE DEFENDANT THREE DAYS BEFORE THE ALlEGED MURDERe
THIS WAS

ERROR

BECAUSE THE

MEANING OF THE WORDS WERE NOT

SUBMITTED IN THEIR PROPER CONTEXT$
Sheriff Gillette testified that Paul Sto Clair told
him three days before the alleged murder that " he was

going to get even with that little son of a
and there

would be a pay day for Vestao" o

b~~Dayton

These words

are extremely important as to the degree of the offense
in this caseo
willfulness~

In particular they go to the elements of

premeditation, deliberation and malice

ar orethought e
The following is What Sheriff Gillette stated on
cross examinationg

{Ro 222)

" Q Did you have any conversation at all with him
on the way over there?
A From Shieldsesn to ~ ~
Q Yes, from Shieldsu over to Wittkesne
A ~ ~the Wittke home? I donut recall what we
talked about~ it was just a short distance~
and I donnt know whether I ~ =
Q Just general conversation?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A

~

1magine that 6 s all it was I donnt recall

anythinge

On page 223 of the record the question is put to
Sheriff

Gillette~

" Q Now these words that you took as threats~ did
you consider them as threats at the time?
A. Well~ he_ was angry and hurt, apparently hurt,
and intoxicated~ so I just figured that maybe
they would ease up later ono Some times they doo
Q Did you = = what did you take those word& as
meaning at the time when they were said?
A Well = = = =
THE COURT~ I wonder. . . excuse me just a moment,
Mrc Gillette~ I wonder i f that would help the
jury -as to what this witness took them to mean~
em

I don°t mean to make objections for you~ but I
am wondering if what he assumed it would mean
would be of any help to the juryo Wouldnnt it
be for the jury to assume what was meant?
MRo BAG~Y I think your honor is right on that,
I withdraw the questione 111
Here~

the court assumes that Gillette is assuming what

the words meant to himo

This is improper because Gillette

himself lmew what the words meant to him and hOif they
impressed himo

This interference by the ·court prejudiced

the defendant becaus.e it prevented possible testimony to
the effect that the words were made under such a state of
mind that St o Clair did not

really understand what

~he

was

saying or that he did not intend to carry out the "threats"
madeo

If the words conveyep the impression to Gillette

that Sto Clair was not serious about the nthreats'' 9 then
this would lessen the weight of other testimony given as
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to the premeditation and deliberation on the part of title

accusedo

This goes to the very distinction between first

and second degree murdere

This question should have been answeredo
situation appeared in People

Vo

156 Po2d 7, at page 13 and the

A similar

Thomas, 25 Cal 2d

880~

court in that case said~

" As to the admissions of defendant it is code law
that evidence of the oral admissions of a party is to
be viewed with cautiono * * i~ * His statement that
he had "laid in wait to catch her" apparently refers
to other occasions when assertedly he had caught her
going out surreptitiouslye But regardless of whether
it refers to other occasions or to this occasion, as
a matter of law it does not on its face and in its
context justify the claim on behalf of the state
that it constitutes an admission of lying in wait

to commit murderou
Here the meaning of the words stated by the accused
must be presented to the jury in their proper context to

avoid a miscarriage of justice0

Most people at one time

or another say things they do not mean or the words spoken
are received in a manner in which they were not intendedo

Conveying_oneus

intention~s

many times a difficult thingo

Sheriff Gillette remembered the ver,y words spoken
by

sto Clair but on cross examination stated that it was

just general conversationc

(Re 222)

When asked what these

damaging words meant the court forbids him to say what
the words meanto

This was prejudicial to the defen~anto
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The court erred in not aJ.lowing Sheriff Gillette to

state what the defendant meant by these wordse

The court

.E

would be correct in not allowing Gillette to testify as to
the meaning of the words only if Gillette was drawing a
eonclusiono

He certainly may state what was meant to

his knowledge or the impression he receivedo

that Sheriff Gillette

said~

~nr

they would ease up later ono

The fact

just figured that maybe

Sometimes they doo t9

was

indicative of the fact that Gillette did not consider the

words very seriouso

Yet~

the jurors were allowed by the

court to reach the conclusion that defendant intended to

carry out the threats without first presenting to the jury

the words in their P!Oper contexte

In any event it was the

duty of the district attorney to object and not the courts o

=IV=

THE EVIDENCE IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE

VERDICT OF FIRST DEGREE MURDERo

None of the evidence properly before the

court~

taken

separately or together could show that the defendant had
fulfilled the requirements under1iivision one of the Russell

case to substantiate first degree murdero

It failed to shOlA

that the defendant had any premeditation as to the shooting,
that he had a specific intent to kill Vesta Wittke~ that he
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willfully took her life at the time of the
he had any malice aforethought to killo

shooting~

or tha1

The elements as

set out in instruction number fourteen were not fulfilledo

In fact the whole atmosphere surrounding the alleged
murder is that of a

~illing

other than first degree murdere

It appears to be more in the nature of a "lover us quarrel" o
From the evidence it is quite clear that Paul and

Vestans relationship was not that of an ordinary boarder
in a homee

'Thes·e- two had had a great affection for one

another or they

wouldn~t

have seen each other after Paul

left the Wittke home near Thanksgiving Day of 1952o
The evidence clearly shows that Sto Clair took the
gun with him to the Wittke home for his

tione

o11m

self protecc:o

He knew from the beating he suffered a few days

before that Vesta and Dayton were dangerous and could

cause great bodily har.me
The conduct of Dayton Wittke certainly shows a great

deal of bias against this defendanto

Dayton helped his

mother beat up Sto Clair and then two days later he came
into his motherns bedroom and attempted to kill the

defendant; he took the pistol 9 pointed-it at Sto

pulled the

trigger~

Clair~

but fortunately it misfiredo

He then

called for an arsenal of guns from Pat and Jacko

He then
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followed Paul out of the house holding a shotgun and a

e22 on himo

As the defendant drove away Dayton fired a

LE

o22 shot into PaulUs car hitting the front door panel on
the driverus sid-eo

Dayton~ doing

all qf this shooting

before~ even knew- that ~.mot~ had

ours)

been shoto (Italics

Bruce Sagers testified as to what Dayton said as

#ollows ~

n

-~

* When

had been shot o ~ 8

Paul was here I didn ot know Mother

He said 9

ably have shot Paul tooo u

91

If I had done ?J I would probe=>

(Rol93)

Paul St o Clair went to the Wittke home to talk to
Vesta Wittkeo

It seems in all probability that he took

the gun with him so that he could ward off another beating •.

Paul did not go there with a preconceived plan or design

to kill Vesta Wittkeo

The malice aforethought as required

under the Russell case is that the killing must be thought
out beforehand and not just the maliceo

This element is

missing in this caseo
The fact that Patricia only heard one shot certainly

allows some credibility to St o Clair 0 s testimony that he
and Vesta Wittke talked for some time before the shooting

took placeo

Actually there were three shots firede

If this had been a cool, claculated.r> premeditated
murder would he have shot Mrso Wittke with Patricia in

the same bed?
the

Did he plan. to have a witness present when
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. ,,;...,;~)~~-~-¥~~~~~~ have an avenue of escape

thougni out beforehand so that he could . get to his car and
l1lake a get away?

All of these questions are answered in the,

negativeo

It is clear that after the alleged murder Sto Clair

sat in a

chair~

escapee

Was this reaction the cool.9 ·e alculatedJ)

dumb ·founded 9 and made no pretense to

pre=-

meditated act of a planned and designed murderer?
The evidence fails to show that the defendant thought

this crime out with the cool and deliberate state of mind
that is required under the case of People

Vo

Hillman,

The court 0 s error in admitting into evidence the knife;
which wasnot connected with the alleged cutting of the
screen; the screen itself certainly prejudiced the rights
of this defendanto

the case

here~

Improperly admitted evidence, as was

cannot help but have its effect upon the

juryo

The Court 0 s failure to permit Sheriff Gillette to

testify as to what he thought the damaging words meant

to him prejudiced this defendanto
The C:ourt 0 s failure to properly instruct the jury

as to the distinction between first degree

m~der

and

second degree murder confused the jury and prejudiced

the defendantRs

CaUSeo
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For the above stated reasons we feel t·hat the evidence

just does not support a verdict of first degree

murder~

therefore we respectfully request that the verdict of the
jury be set aside and a new trial granted or in the alter-

native that_. this court modify the verdict based upon the

evidence as a matter of lawo
Respectfully submitted,

Clayton Lo Simmons
John Co Beaslin
Henry S" Nygaard

Attorneys far Defendant
'·and Appellant
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Receipt of copies of the above and foregoing Brief
of the Defendant and lppellant acknowledged this _ __
day

of

Ju~~ 1956~

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent
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